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A dominant view is that perceptual confidence is deter-
mined by the strength of incoming sensory signals 
(Barthelme & Mamassian, 2010; Kepecs, Uchida, Zariwala, 
& Mainen, 2008; Kiani & Shadlen, 2009; Vickers, 1979; 
Zylberberg, Barttfeld, & Sigman, 2012; see Yeung & 
Summerfield, 2012, for a review). However, perceptual-
decision signals are also seen in neural circuits special-
ized for motor actions (Cisek & Kalaska, 2005; Freedman 
& Assad, 2011; Hernandez, Zainos, & Romo, 2002; Romo, 
Hernandez, & Zainos, 2004; Shadlen & Newsome, 2001), 
which suggests that the motor system may also contrib-
ute to visual confidence. Indeed, in dominant models of 
perceptual decision making (Gold & Shadlen, 2007), sen-
sory evidence is accumulated in “embodied” effector-
specific circuits, and confidence increases in proportion 
to the amount of evidence supporting one response over 
another (Kiani & Shadlen, 2009; Vickers, 1979). This view 
raises the novel and counterintuitive prediction that 
directly interfering with action-specific representations 
may alter confidence in a visual discrimination. Moreover, 
as metacognitive accuracy depends on the trial-by-trial 
correspondence between confidence and performance, 
such action-specific interference may also impair meta-
cognitive accuracy. The demonstration of such effects 
would shed light on the mechanisms of confidence and 
metacognition.
In the present research, we set out to test this hypoth-
esis. We applied unilateral single-pulse transcranial mag-
netic stimulation (TMS) to the dorsal premotor cortex 
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Abstract
Theoretical models of perception assume that confidence is related to the quality or strength of sensory processing. 
Counter to this intuitive view, we showed in the present research that the motor system also contributes to judgments of 
perceptual confidence. In two experiments, we used transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to manipulate response-
specific representations in the premotor cortex, selectively disrupting postresponse confidence in visual discrimination 
judgments. Specifically, stimulation of the motor representation associated with the unchosen response reduced 
confidence in correct responses, thereby reducing metacognitive capacity without changing visual discrimination 
performance. Effects of TMS on confidence were observed when stimulation was applied both before and after the 
response occurred, which suggests that confidence depends on late-stage metacognitive processes. These results place 
constraints on models of perceptual confidence and metacognition by revealing that action-specific information in the 
premotor cortex contributes to perceptual confidence.
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(PMd) of participants during a difficult perceptual dis-
crimination. Participants were asked to report, using their 
left or right hand, their visual discrimination response 
(which side of the screen contained a grating stimulus 
superimposed on noise in Experiment 1; whether a cen-
tral grating was horizontally or vertically oriented in 
Experiment 2) and provide a confidence rating for their 
discrimination. On each trial, a single TMS pulse was 
delivered at one of two time points—either 100 ms after 
stimulus onset or immediately following the response 
(Fig. 1). As the premotor cortex is known to contain lat-
eralized motor representations (Passingham, 1993) and is 
directly connected to the lateral prefrontal cortex, which 
has been linked to metacognition (Fleming, Huijgen, & 
Dolan, 2012; Fleming, Weil, Nagy, Dolan, & Rees, 2010; 
Rounis, Maniscalco, Rothwell, Passingham, & Lau, 2010), 
we hypothesized that TMS would affect visual confidence 
(and therefore metacognitive accuracy) differently 
depending on whether the hand participants responded 
with was contralateral to (congruent trials) or ipsilateral 
to (incongruent trials) the hemisphere that was being 
stimulated.
The inclusion of pre- and postresponse-stimulation 
conditions allowed us to assess whether metacognitive 
confidence depends on continued processing of effector-
specific evidence after the decision has been made. In 
decisional-locus models, confidence is based on the evi-
dence available at the time of the judgment (Kiani & 
Shadlen, 2009; Vickers, 1979). In postdecisional-locus 
models, confidence also depends on the accumulation of 
evidence after the decision (Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010). 
A demonstration that response-specific TMS affects con-
fidence even when applied after the decision would sup-
port postdecisional-locus accounts of confidence.
We found that, in two experiments, both pre- and 
postresponse TMS to PMd affected visual confidence in a 
response-dependent manner, with incongruence between 
TMS and participants’ response reducing confidence and 
metacognitive accuracy. In an otherwise identical experi-
ment, applying TMS to primary motor cortex (M1) did 
not affect confidence. Together, our results reveal that 
action-specific information in the premotor cortex con-
tributes to perceptual confidence.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants. Participants were healthy volunteers with 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no history of 
neurological or psychiatric disorders. We based our sam-
ple size on a previously published TMS study from our 
laboratory (Rounis et al., 2010). We decided prior to data 
collection to test at least 20 participants in each 
experiment. Twenty-five participants completed the PMd 
experiment, and 23 completed the M1 experiment. We 
excluded any participant with more than 20% missed 
responses overall (n = 12). An additional 2 participants 
were excluded because of unstable threshold estimation 
leading to ceiling performance (> 90%) in the main task. 
Thus, 17 participants contributed data to the PMd group 
(10 females, 7 males; mean age = 23.5 years, SD = 7.5), 
and 17 participants contributed data to the M1 group (10 
females, 7 males; mean age = 23.5 years, SD = 2.8). In the 
final sample, 11 participants in each group received right-
hemisphere stimulation. The experiment was approved 
by the Columbia University Institutional Review Board.
Equipment. Participants were seated 60 cm in front of 
an iMac monitor (24-in. LCD, 1,920-pixel × 1,200-pixel 
resolution, 60-Hz refresh rate) and responded using the 
standard Apple keyboard. Stimuli were generated using 
the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997) 
in MATLAB (The MathWorks, Natick, MA). A standard 
figure-of-eight coil with 70-mm circular components 
(MagStim, Whitland, United Kingdom) was used to 
deliver single-pulse TMS.
Stimuli and procedure. Experiment 1 was carried out 
at the Department of Psychology, Columbia University. In 
the main experiment, participants received TMS over 
PMd. We also carried out a separate control experiment 
in which the stimulation site was moved to M1. The pro-
cedure for both experiments was otherwise identical. For 
both groups, TMS was applied unilaterally, with stimula-
tion side counterbalanced between participants.
On each trial, two stimuli were presented 4° on either 
side of fixation for 33 ms (Fig. 1). Each stimulus was a 
circle (3° diameter) containing randomly generated white 
noise. The target stimulus was a randomly oriented sinu-
soidal grating (2 cycles per degree) embedded in one of 
the noise patches. After the offset of the stimuli, partici-
pants provided a forced-choice judgment as to whether 
the left or right stimulus contained the target grating by 
pressing, respectively, the “f” key with their left hand or the 
“j” key with their right hand. On half the trials, participants 
received a single TMS pulse 100 ms after stimulus onset 
(preresponse condition), whereas on the other half, TMS 
was applied immediately after participants made their 
response (postresponse condition). These conditions were 
randomly interleaved. Following the 1,500-ms response 
period, participants were asked to provide a confidence 
rating on a scale from 1 (low confidence) to 4 (high confi-
dence) by pressing the “j,” “k,” “l,” or “;” keys, respectively, 
using their right hand. Participants were encouraged to 
use the full range of the confidence scale. Participants 
were instructed to maintain fixation on a central crosshair 
(subtending 0.35°) for the duration of the trial.

































Fig. 1. Example trial sequence from (a) Experiment 1 and (b) Experiment 2. In Experiment 1, participants briefly viewed two noise patches, 
on one of which a grating was superimposed, and subsequently had to indicate the side on which the grating was presented. In Experiment 
2, participants briefly viewed a centrally presented grating and then had to indicate whether it had been horizontally or vertically oriented. A 
single pulse of transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) was applied either 100 ms after stimulus onset (preresponse condition) or immediately 
after participants’ response (postresponse condition). The hemisphere that received TMS was counterbalanced across participants. Following 
each response, participants were asked to provide a confidence rating on a scale from 1 (low confidence) to 4 (high confidence) 1,500 ms 
after the offset of the stimulus. RT = response time.
The experiment consisted of 400 trials split into four 
blocks of 100 trials each. Rest periods were interleaved 
between blocks. Prior to the start of the main experi-
mental session, grating contrast was adjusted to yield 
threshold performance for each individual participant 
using the QUEST procedure (Watson & Pelli, 1983). The 
contrast of the target stimulus was defined as the sum 
of a grating with Michelson contrast Cgrating and a patch 
of visual noise with Michelson contrast Cnoise. The total 
contrast of the target stimulus, Ctarget = Cgrating + Cnoise, 
was set to 0.9. The nontarget stimulus was also set to a 
Michelson contrast of 0.9. The QUEST procedure esti-
mated the ratio of the grating contrast to the noise con-
trast (Rgrating = Cgrating/Cnoise) that yielded 70% correct 
performance. Three independent threshold estimates of 
Rgrating were acquired, with 40 randomly ordered trials 
contributing to each. Confidence ratings were also col-
lected while threshold performance was determined, 
but they were not analyzed further. The median value 
of these threshold estimates was used to set the value 
of Rgrating in the main experiment, which remained 
constant.
TMS protocol. To prepare participants for TMS, we first 
marked the intersection of the nasion-inion line and the 
interaural line with ink on a swim cap as Point X, in line 
with the 10-20 system (Meyer, Britton, Kloten, & Stein-
metz, 1991). A mark was also made 5 cm to the left or 
right of Point X on the interaural line (Point A; Mills & 
Nithi, 1997). The position on the motor cortex that elic-
ited a finger or arm twitch with the minimal stimulus 
intensity was then located. We initially set the intensity to 
70% of the maximum stimulator output, decreasing it by 
5% while moving the coil anteroposteriorly and mediolat-
erally in relation to Point A in steps of 0.5 cm. With each 
decrease, a single pulse was delivered. Decreases and 
movements were made until the lowest percentage inten-
sity at which at least 5 out of 10 stimulations resulted in 
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an observable twitch of the finger, arm, or wrist was 
found. This position (the motor hot spot) was labeled 
(Point B), and the minimal intensity was recorded as the 
active motor threshold (AMT).
The site of PMd stimulation was 3 cm anterior to Point 
B on a line parallel to the midsaggital line. Previous stud-
ies have shown good correspondence between scalp 
positions 2 to 3 cm anterior to the motor hot spot and the 
underlying dorsal premotor complex (Bestmann, 
Baudewig, Siebner, Rothwell, & Frahm, 2005; Chen, 
Mima, Siebner, Oga, & Hara, 2003; Johansen-Berg et al., 
2002; O’Shea, Sebastian, Boorman, Johansen-Berg, & 
Rushworth, 2007; Schluter, Rushworth, Passingham, & 
Mills, 1998). M1 stimulation was located at Point B. Single 
pulses were delivered at a stimulation intensity of 90% of 
AMT.
Data analysis. No statistical analyses were conducted 
prior to the completion of testing for all participants. 
Participants’ responses were classified according to 
whether they were contralateral (congruent trials) or 
ipsilateral (incongruent trials) to the TMS pulse and 
whether they were correct or erroneous. Response times 
(RTs) were measured to the stimulus, as well as between 
the onset of the confidence-rating screen and the confi-
dence rating. Effects of condition on confidence ratings 
and RTs were assessed via hierarchical linear mixed-
effects regression using the lme4 package in R (Version 
3.0.1; Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014). We 
obtained p values for regression coefficients using the 
car package (Fox & Weisberg, 2011). Mixed-effects logis-
tic regression was used to estimate effects of condition 
on response accuracy. All effects were taken as random 
at the participant level, and condition estimates and sta-
tistics reported are at the population level. Predictors 
were coded as follows—accuracy: error = 0, correct = 1; 
congruence: incongruent = 0, congruent = 1; time: pre-
response = 0, postresponse = 1. We calculated 95% con-
fidence intervals (CIs) on summary statistics using a 
bootstrap procedure (Efron & Tibshirani, 1993).
Results and discussion
In our analyses, the congruence between the TMS pulse 
and participants’ response (congruent, incongruent) was 
crossed with the time when TMS was applied (before the 
response, after the response). Participants used the full 
range of the 4-point confidence scale (Table S3 in the 
Supplemental Material available online). We carried out a 
factorial analysis of both discrimination performance and 
subjective confidence.
For the PMd group, neither TMS-response congruence 
nor time of stimulation influenced visual discrimination 
performance (Fig. 2a; congruence: β = −0.02, SE = 0.17, 
p = .91; time: β = 0.0002, SE = 0.09, p = .99). In addition, 
despite the TMS pulse being lateralized, it did not induce 
overt response bias (95% CI for percentage of contralat-
eral responses: preresponse condition = [43%, 55%]; 
postresponse condition = [44%, 56%]).
To understand how TMS affected trial-by-trial subjec-
tive confidence, we constructed a mixed-effects regres-
sion model to explain confidence using binary predictors 
for congruence, time, and accuracy (Table 1). As expected, 
















































Stimulation Condition Stimulation Condition
Fig. 2. Mean proportion of correct responses in the group that received transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) in the dorsal premotor cortex in 
(a) Experiment 1 and (b) Experiment 2. Results are shown separately for congruent and incongruent trials when TMS was delivered before or after 
participants’ response. In (b), results are also shown for a control condition (in which TMS was not applied). Error bars reflect standard errors of 
the mean.
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confidence, with greater confidence on trials with correct 
responses than on trials with errors (p < .001). Crucially, 
we also found significant effects of congruence: 
Participants reported lower confidence overall when TMS 
was incongruent with their response than when it was 
congruent (p < .05). In addition, there was a significant 
interaction of congruence and accuracy: Confidence was 
lower on incongruent trials with correct responses but 
higher on incongruent trials with errors (p < .05; Fig. 3a; 
see also Table S1 in the Supplemental Material). No main 
effects or interactions with time were found (p > .29), 
which indicates that the action-specific effects of TMS on 
confidence are not specific to its delivery before or after 
a perceptual decision.
Congruence did not affect measures of RT to either 
the stimulus (β = −0.008, SE = 0.03, p = .78) or the con-
fidence rating (β = 0.03, SE = 0.03, p = .33), which makes 
it unlikely that effects on metacognition were mediated 
by effects of TMS on details of the action itself (see Fig. 
S1 and Tables S4 and S5 in the Supplemental Material); 
there were main effects of stimulation time on RT result-
ing from a general speeding effect of preresponse TMS—
decision RT: β = 0.07, SE = 0.02, p < .01; rating RT: β = 
0.08, SE = 0.02, p < .001. No effects of M1 TMS congru-
ence on confidence were observed (Table 2; all ps > 
.16), despite a very similar pattern of TMS effects on RTs 
(Fig. S2 in the Supplemental Material). In a regression 
model including stimulation location as a between-
groups factor, the critical three-way interaction among 
location, congruency, and accuracy was significant (β = 
0.19, SE = 0.09, p < .05), which indicates that action-
specific effects of TMS on confidence were observed at 
PMd but not M1.
Together, our results demonstrate that interfering with 
premotor representations associated with responses in a 
visual discrimination task leads to systematic changes in 
confidence despite discrimination accuracy remaining 
unchanged. One potential mechanism mediating these 
effects is that TMS interferes with sensory evidence in 
embodied, effector-specific circuits both before and after 
a choice has been made. However, we also considered 
an alternative explanation. The design of Experiment 1 
required participants to decide whether the left or right 
visual hemifield contained a grating patch. As PMd is 
adjacent to the frontal eye fields, which contain repre-
sentations of contralateral visual space (Mohler, 
Goldberg, & Wurtz, 1973), it is possible that lateralized 
TMS pulses led to visual attentional biases that affected 
confidence to a greater degree than decision accuracy. 
In Experiment 2, we examined the effect of premotor 
TMS on a nonspatial version of the task to rule out this 
nonmotoric explanation.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was similar to Experiment 1, with two alter-
ations. First, the task required a nonspatial judgment as to 
whether a centrally presented grating was oriented hori-
zontally or vertically. Second, we included a baseline 
condition without TMS on one-fifth of trials.
Method
Participants. Data were collected from 20 healthy vol-
unteers with normal or corrected-to-normal vision and 
no history of neurological or psychiatric disorders. The 
same exclusion criteria were applied as in Experiment 1: 
2 participants were excluded due to unstable threshold 
estimation leading to ceiling performance in the main 
task. Eighteen participants’ data were analyzed (8 females, 
10 males; mean age = 25.4 years, SD = 4.4). In the final 
sample, 8 participants received right-hemisphere stimula-
tion. The study was approved by the City University of 
New York Institutional Review Board.
Equipment. The stimuli were presented at a distance 
of 57 cm on a Sony Triniton 17-in. CRT monitor with a 
refresh rate of 60 Hz. As in Experiment 1, the Psycho-
physics Toolbox and MATLAB were used to generate 
the stimuli, and a standard figure-of-eight coil with 
70-mm circular components was used to deliver single-
pulse TMS.
Stimuli and procedure. Experiment 2 was carried 
out at the Department of Psychology at The City Col-
lege of the City University of New York. A single low-
contrast grating was presented centrally on each trial 
(Fig. 1b). Participants made a forced-choice judgment 
as to whether the grating was oriented horizontally or 
vertically by pressing, respectively, the “f” key with 
Table 1. Results From Experiment 1: Regression Analyses 
Predicting Confidence From Accuracy, Congruence, and Time 
in the Dorsal-Premotor-Cortex (PMd) Group
Predictor b p
Intercept 2.08 (0.14) < .0001**
Accuracy 0.52 (0.10) < .0001**
Congruence –0.19 (0.08) .03*
Time –0.08 (0.08) .29
Accuracy × Congruence 0.22 (0.09) .01*
Accuracy × Time 0.04 (0.09) .66
Congruence × Time 0.08 (0.11) .45
Accuracy × Congruence × Time –0.07 (0.12) .54
Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses. Predictors were coded 
as follows—accuracy: error = 0, correct = 1; congruence: incongruent = 
0, congruent = 1; time: preresponse = 0, postresponse = 1.
*p < .05. **p < .01.
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their left hand or the “j” key with their right hand on a 
standard keyboard. As in Experiment 1, a single TMS 
pulse was delivered at one of two time points—100 ms 
after stimulus onset (preresponse condition) or imme-
diately following participants’ response (postresponse 
condition). TMS was applied unilaterally, and only over 
PMd, with stimulation side counterbalanced between 
participants. Following their response, participants 
were asked to provide a confidence rating on a scale 
from 1 (low confidence) to 4 (high confidence) by 
pressing the “h,” “j,” “k,” or “l” keys, respectively, using 
their right hand. Prior to the experiment, the contrast of 
the grating was titrated using the QUEST procedure, as 
described for Experiment 1.
The main experiment consisted of 500 trials split into 
five blocks of 100 trials each. Two hundred preresponse-
TMS trials, 200 postresponse-TMS trials, and 100 no-TMS 
trials were randomly interleaved. The TMS protocol was 
identical to that in Experiment 1.
Results
As in Experiment 1, neither congruence nor time of stim-
ulation influenced visual discrimination performance 
(Fig. 2b; congruence: β = −0.13, SE = 0.13, p = .34; time: 
β = 0.12, SE = 0.09, p = .18), and there was no evidence 
that TMS pulses induced a contralateral bias in respond-
ing (95% CI for percentage of contralateral responses—
preresponse condition = [47%, 55%]; postresponse 
condition = [49%, 56%]). Effects of TMS on RTs to both 
the decision and confidence rating were similar to those 
observed in Experiment 1 (Fig. S1).
Crucially, despite the task requiring a nonspatial judg-
ment, in Experiment 2, we replicated the effects of TMS-
response congruence on confidence observed in 
Experiment 1. Specifically, we found a significant interac-
tion of congruence and accuracy (p < .05; Fig. 3b). Again 
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Fig. 3. Confidence ratings in the group that received transcranial mag-
netic stimulation (TMS) in the dorsal premotor cortex in (a) Experiment 
1 and (b, c) Experiment 2. The graphs in (a) and (b) show raw mean 
confidence ratings as a function of stimulation condition, response 
accuracy, and congruence. In (b), results are also shown for a control 
condition (in which TMS was not applied) for trials responded to cor-
rectly and incorrectly. Dashed lines reflect mean confidence in the con-
trol condition. The graph in (c) shows baseline-corrected confidence 
data in Experiment 2 as a function of response accuracy. Baseline-
corrected confidence data were calculated by subtracting mean raw 
confidence ratings on no-TMS trials from mean raw confidence ratings 
on TMS trials. Error bars reflect standard errors of the mean. Asterisks 
indicate a significant difference between TMS conditions (p < .05).
Table 2. Results From Experiment 1: Regression Analyses 
Predicting Confidence From Accuracy, Congruence, and Time 
in the Primary-Motor-Cortex (M1) Group
Predictor b p
Intercept 1.80 (0.11) < .0001**
Accuracy 0.46 (0.07) < .0001**
Congruence –0.08 (0.09) .35
Time 0.006 (0.07) .93
Accuracy × Congruence –0.03 (0.10) .80
Accuracy × Time –0.01 (0.08) .88
Congruence × Time –0.06 (0.10) .56
Accuracy × Congruence × Time 0.05 (0.13) .69
Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses. Predictors were coded 
as follows—accuracy: error = 0, correct = 1; congruence: incongruent = 
0, congruent = 1; time: preresponse = 0, postresponse = 1.
**p < .01.
Action-Specific Disruption of Confidence 95
with time. The main effect of congruence did not reach 
significance in Experiment 2 (p = .09; see Table 3).
The addition of a no-TMS control condition in 
Experiment 2 allowed us to quantify changes in confi-
dence on congruent and incongruent trials relative to a 
neutral baseline. We baseline-corrected the confidence 
data on TMS trials by subtracting out the mean confi-
dence on no-TMS trials (shown in Fig. 3b) for each indi-
vidual participant. From this analysis, we found that 
TMS congruency exerted predominant effects on trials 
with correct responses rather than on trials with errors 
(Fig. 3c).
Metacognitive Efficiency
The effect of TMS on confidence in both Experiments 1 
and 2 suggests that PMd stimulation may have conse-
quences for metacognitive efficiency or the ability to dis-
criminate between one’s own correct and incorrect 
responses. We computed a model-based measure of 
metacognitive efficiency, meta-d′/d′ (Maniscalco & Lau, 
2012). This approach takes into account changes in basic 
task performance (d′) that may influence metacognitive 
performance (meta-d′; Galvin, Podd, Drga, & Whitmore, 
2003; Maniscalco & Lau, 2012), thereby obscuring to 
what extent changes in meta-d′ originate from changes in 
the functioning of metacognitive mechanisms per se, 
rather than being driven by the quality of the perceptual 
input into such mechanisms. Meta-d′/d′ controls for such 
potential confounds by measuring participants’ metacog-
nitive performance (meta-d′), given their performance on 
the perceptual task (d′). When meta-d′/d′ = 1, partici-
pants can be said to be metacognitively optimal.
Pooling data from both PMd experiments, we esti-
mated meta-d′ separately for each TMS condition (see the 
Supplemental Material for full details of this procedure). 
Effects of condition on meta-d′/d′ were assessed with 
mixed-effects analyses of variance (ANOVAs) in R with 
the factors experiment (1, 2), TMS-response congruency 
(congruent, incongruent), and stimulation time (prere-
sponse, postresponse).
Compared with congruent TMS, incongruent TMS was 
found to significantly reduce meta-d′/d′, F(1, 33) = 5.91, 
p = .02, ηp2 = .15 (Fig. 4; see also Table S2 in the 
Supplemental Material). This effect held when we ana-
lyzed meta-d′ uncorrected by d′, F(1, 33) = 4.60, p = .04, 
ηp2 = .12. Examining paired comparisons between the 
pre- and postresponse conditions, only preresponse TMS 
was found to interfere with metacognitive efficiency, pre-
response: t(34) = 3.12, p = .004; postresponse: t(34) = 
0.95, p = .35, and when compared with an optimal meta-
d′/d′ value of 1, only incongruent TMS delivered before 
the response led to suboptimal metacognitive efficiency 
(95% CI = [0.54, 0.86]). However, the absence of a postre-
sponse effect of TMS on meta-d′/d′ should be interpreted 
with caution, as the Congruence × Time interaction was 
not significant, F(1, 34) = 2.21, p = .15, ηp2 = .06. The 
effect of TMS congruence on meta-d′/d′ was consistent 
across experiments—interaction with experiment: F(1, 
33) = 0.70, p = .41, ηp2 = .02 (Fig. S3 in the Supplemental 
Material). In keeping with an absence of an effect of M1 
TMS on confidence, results showed that M1 stimulation 
had no effect on metacognitive efficiency, F(1, 16) = 0.13, 
p = .73, ηp2 = .008 (Fig. S2).
Table 3. Results From Experiment 2: Regression Analyses 
Predicting Confidence From Accuracy, Congruence, and Time 
in the Dorsal-Premotor-Cortex (PMd) Group
Predictor b p
Intercept 2.06 (0.11) < .0001**
Accuracy 0.63 (0.11) < .0001**
Congruence –0.13 (0.08) .09
Time –0.13 (0.08) .12
Accuracy × Congruence 0.32 (0.13) .01*
Accuracy × Time 0.22 (0.10) .02*
Congruence × Time 0.18 (0.11) .10
Accuracy × Congruence × Time –0.16 (0.14) .23
Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses. Predictors were coded 
as follows—accuracy: error = 0, correct = 1; congruence: incongruent = 
0, congruent = 1; time: preresponse = 0, postresponse = 1.















Fig. 4. Metacognitive efficiency (meta-d′/d′) as a function of stimu-
lation condition and congruence in the group that received transcra-
nial magnetic stimulation (TMS) in the dorsal premotor cortex, pooled 
across Experiments 1 and 2. For each data bar, error bars on the left 
reflect standard errors of the mean, and error bars on the right reflect 
bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals. The dashed line indicates the 
optimal meta-d′/d′ value. Asterisks indicate a significant difference 
between conditions (p < .01).
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General Discussion
In the present research, we used single-pulse TMS to 
interfere with the causal chain from perception to action, 
finding an action-specific contribution to confidence in a 
visual discrimination task. Whereas previous work has 
focused on the contribution of sensory information to 
confidence, our results show that action-specific cortical 
representations also contribute to perceptual confidence.
Specifically, perturbation of premotor representations 
associated with responses in a visual discrimination task 
led to systematic changes in confidence despite discrimi-
nation accuracy remaining unchanged. Similar effects were 
seen when TMS pulses were applied both before and 
immediately after a visual discrimination, in accordance 
with the importance of postdecisional processes for deter-
mining confidence (Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010). By 
including a no-TMS control condition in Experiment 2, we 
found that this change was predominantly driven by diver-
gent effects of incongruent and congruent TMS on confi-
dence for trials with correct responses. Specifically, TMS 
applied to the hemisphere incongruent with (ipsilateral to) 
the selected response reduced confidence, whereas TMS 
applied to the congruent (contralateral) hemisphere 
increased confidence. However, in both experiments, 
there was some evidence for an opposite pattern on trials 
with errors, such that the effects of TMS congruence inter-
acted with decision accuracy. It is possible that less-consis-
tent effects were observed on trials with errors because of 
reduced power to detect an effect on these trials, which by 
design were less numerous (~25%). We additionally found 
that metacognitive efficiency was reduced on incongruent 
trials independently of visual discrimination performance.
The mechanism by which action-specific TMS per-
turbs confidence remains to be determined. Dynamic 
models of the decision process suggest that confidence 
is based on the balance of evidence between competing 
accumulators supporting one or another choice option 
(Merkle & Van Zandt, 2006; Vickers, 1979). In this view, 
if TMS boosts or reduces the evidence for or against a 
choice, postresponse confidence would be altered in a 
systematic manner. For example, on incongruent trials, 
boosting the evidence supporting the unchosen response 
representation would tend to reduce confidence, 
whereas boosting the evidence in support of the chosen 
response on congruent trials may increase response con-
fidence (Figs. 3a and 3b). However, this account cannot 
explain why effects of TMS were more pronounced on 
trials with correct responses compared with trials con-
taining errors (Fig. 3c). An alternative possibility is that 
incongruence between TMS and the response hand 
leads to increased error or noise in confidence ratings 
(Erev, Wallsten, & Budescu, 1994), which could lead to a 
regression toward the mean on trials with both correct 
responses and errors and the observed decrease in meta-
cognitive accuracy (Fig. 4).
More broadly, our data are consistent with the finding 
that the fluency of an action affects metacognitive assess-
ments such as confidence or sense of control 
(Oppenheimer, 2008). For example, insertion of a sub-
liminal arrow cue pointing in the opposite direction than 
the required motor response reduces participants’ sense 
of control, whereas an arrow in the same (congruent) 
direction increases sense of control (Wenke, Fleming, & 
Haggard, 2010). However, the manipulation of fluency in 
these studies was achieved via a perceptual cue, albeit 
subliminal, and therefore it is not possible to distinguish 
whether the cue’s effects on metacognitive judgments of 
control were due to effects on perception, action, or 
both. Here, by directly stimulating action-specific repre-
sentations in premotor cortex during and after a visual 
discrimination, we demonstrated that direct perturbation 
of effector-specific representations alter metacognitive 
judgments of perceptual confidence.
Action-specific effects were observed at PMd but not 
at M1, which suggests that interfering with motor func-
tion per se may not affect metacognition. Instead, it 
appears that higher-level action representations in PMd 
(Graziano, Taylor, Moore, & Cooke, 2002; Passingham, 
1993) may contribute to subjective confidence. PMd is 
implicated in the linking of stimuli to actions (Halsband 
& Passingham, 1985) and contains graded activity associ-
ated with the evolution of a decision (Cisek & Kalaska, 
2005; Hernandez et al., 2002). It is also directly connected 
to the lateral prefrontal cortex, which has been linked to 
metacognition (Fleming et al., 2010, 2012; Rounis et al., 
2010). In contrast, there is no direct connection between 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and M1 (Passingham, 1993), 
and M1 activity is more tightly linked to the motor 
response itself, which may explain why it did not contrib-
ute to confidence estimates in visual discrimination.
One potential limitation of our study is that brain-
imaging-guided methods were not available to localize 
the target of stimulation. We can be confident that M1 
stimulation is on target, because of the elicitation of 
specific twitches in the relevant muscles of the contra-
lateral hand. Anterior to this location, PMd is the most 
plausible region to show hand-specific effects. We note 
that there are neurons associated with unilateral space 
in neighboring regions of the prefrontal cortex, such as 
the frontal eye field (Ro, Cheifet, Ingle, Shoup, & Rafal, 
1999; Ro, Farnè, & Chang, 2002). However, the absence 
of performance differences between congruent and 
incongruent conditions, and the replication of the find-
ings from Experiment 1 in a nonspatial version of the 
task in Experiment 2, makes a spatial-attentional expla-
nation of our findings unlikely. Thus, we believe that 
the site of effective stimulation is PMd, in line with 
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previous studies using similar methods of localization 
for this area (Bestmann et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2003; 
Johansen-Berg et al., 2002; O’Shea et al., 2007; Schluter 
et al., 1998).
Together, our findings reveal that action-specific deci-
sion signals contribute to visual confidence. The obser-
vation of action-specific contributions to confidence 
places constraints on future models of confidence and 
metacognition.
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